Anecdotal Evidence of Current Cultural Politics in Romania and the Republic of Moldova

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Abstract:
Current political science, written in English, provides plenty of anecdotal evidence for a change in the cultural politics of both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The paradigm shift is apparent and proposed by the avowedly Europhile establishment of both countries. In the name of alignment to the West, the reshuffle of national priorities is plain to see in the assertive language of public narratives about development, geopolitics, or security. Competing narratives of identity negotiate notions of weak-states (Moldova) and post-E.U. enlargement (Romania) by the literary means of public storytelling about the past. The (Post-Soviet) Eurasian community, patterns of national identification, and European transnationalism are the fault lines that structure the debate about 21st century Romania and Moldova. Explicitly, they translate into a grand theme of revolution, which is customary in the modern literary culture of Romania. By association, the Romance-speaking indigenous population of Moldova shares in the same tradition. Conclusively, Romanian and Moldovan readers of the ‘revolution’ motif in contemporary history come together on the meaning they assign to maintenance and forcible substitution of social order.

Keywords: Memory studies, cultural politics, revolution, Romania, Moldova

1. Mapping the Ground
I choose to read literary cultures as records of “how societies remember” (Connerton, 1989: 1). In view of that, the modern Romanian one is an inventory of the struggle to make the country and its people modern. The revolutionary bent of its public storytelling about the past is conspicuous. For the most part, regime overthrow and social change are traditional themes in various narrative instances of the national master story. Romanian patterns of self-identification come together in the language of dramatic social change and political makeover of the country. To a large extent, it is a matter of storytelling that relies on metaphors meant to foreground the notion of Romanian identity.

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Explicitly, history books as well as fiction are obviously committed to circulate and advertise the cultural politics of the nation state. For example, historical fictions were the mouthpiece of official historiography in Greater Romania. Likewise, early 1950s socialist realism made a case for the newly set up ‘popular republic’ and Soviet-style communism. Later on, Eugen Barbu’s fiction sang the praises of Nicolae Ceausescu and his autocratic regime. With the benefits of hindsight, it is fair to say that the novel genre commonly advocates for the use of ideology in aesthetic discourse. In other words, the alignment to the social order of the day seems to have always been high on the agenda of creative writing.

Actually, the skills of fiction writers structure the storytelling done in non-fictional narratives, for instance, in the discourse of political science. What is more, (literary) realism as a touchstone of cultural value in public communication is a buzzword of social sciences too. In the West, the story told by the establishment is that, lately, as a result of “materialist and world-weary realism [...] instead of exploring politics, social scientists began to explore society” (Alexander, 2006: 39). It is no surprise that the way culture and power make sense together as “cultural politics” (O’Sullivan, 2005: 5) comes across vividly in the study of political science as a field of social sciences. Current political science written in English provides plenty of anecdotal evidence for a change in the cultural politics of both Romania and the Republic of Moldova. The paradigm shift is apparent and proposed by the avowedly Europhile establishment of both countries in the name of alignment to the West. The reshuffle of national priorities is plain to see in the assertive language of public narratives about development, geopolitics, or security. Essentially, competing narratives of identity negotiate the ideas of weak-states (Moldova) and post-E.U. enlargement (Romania). Two issues are in the spotlight: the literary means of public storytelling about the past and the likely prospects of Westernization. It turns out that political science explores the way societies remember, not to mention the way they obviously forget (Connerton, 2009: 1). As a result, reading social sciences supplies the so-called memory studies with valuable insights into the workings of national self-identification in the literary culture of 20th-century Romania.

The rhetorical commonplace of social science help native and foreign authors reach obviously dissimilar conclusions. The (Post-Soviet) Eurasian community, various instances of national self-identification, and European transnationalism are the fault lines that structure the debate about the locals in their relation to the East and the West. In not so many words, indigenous and Western readers of the ‘revolution’
motif in Romanian self-identification predictably resort to an organicist fallacy. Their discourse constantely looks for epoch-making events in the past (as well as the present) of the country. However, they reflect differently on the significance culturally attributed to forcible substitution of social order. Although they agree that most revolutions (except for the Communist one) brought Romanian identity closer to Western global society, the mostly celebratory mood of the natives (when it comes to their Europeanism) has no counterpart in the Western reading of the same events.

Ordinarily, nationalism is either acknowledged or implicit in various narrative instances of Romanian literary culture (literature, academic discourses, reporting on social reality, etc.). For instance, in the discourse of social science the rhetoric of self-identification provides evidence of the functional overlap between patriotism and civic engagement. The “imagined community” (Anderson, 2006: 1) of the nation needs the public service performed by cultural storytelling, which is believed to stem from the assumption that “minds work together in society” (Olick, 2011: 18). My choice of current, English-written accounts of local identity sheds light on what is, essentially, the self-serving story told by nationally-minded scholars. Since the very beginnings of the country’s literary culture, the issues of state-building and patriotic fervour have intertwined in academic discourses. Particularly the academics of the Old Kingdom and Greater Romania, “historical scholars – [...] Iorga for Romanians – became fathers of the nation” (Hutchinson, 2005: 51), I intend to prove that the legacy passed on to the present.

Indigenous and Western readings of national self-identification in Romania do not see eye to eye over this grand theme of revolution, i.e., over the ideological meanings assigned to social unrest, uprisings, etc. The natives construe insurrectional moments in their history as examples of systemic transformations, while the West perceives them as mostly an attempt to transform “the natural individual into the cultural individual [...] a task that will never be completed without violence” (Benjamin 1912: 59).

Irina Liveazeanu’s 1995 seminal book Cultural Politics in Greater Romania delivers a comprehensive picture of Romanian identity narratives and of the way they were used by the nation state in order to achieve its ends. I rely on her work, which, alongside Maria Bucur’s Eugenics and Modernization in interwar Romania (2002), defines my take on the cultural politics of interwar Romania. All in all, the views of the above-mentioned authors are inherently sympathetic to the goals of
Romanian self-identification, though they depart from the home-grown nationalism of socialist Romania.

The assessment of the master story promoted by Greater Romania brings into play the same revolutionary rhetoric: “The unification of the Romanian lands in 1918 constituted a national revolution – despite the unquestionable linguistic, historical, and cultural ties existing among the Romanians” (Livezeanu, 1995: 7). At the time, the drive to achieve a sense of “national rebirth” (Bucur, 2002: 19) was the target of the policy carried out by the nation state. Anyway, the actual making of the state under German-born kings is the benchmark against which subsequent narratives of identity are devised in the mainstream of Romanian life. This Romanian “golden age” (Smith, 2009: 36) comes across as a time of turmoil rather than celebration in Irina Livezeanu’s influential reading of interwar “regionalism, nation building and ethnic struggle” (Livezeanu, 1995: 1). Conclusively, Greater Romania is the yardstick of the nation’s political success and underpins the language of self-identification in English-written social science too. These texts elaborate on the theses of Romanian historiography, mostly on ethnic continuity, national unity, and indigenous politics historically contiguous and documented in the literature of neighbouring medieval states. From the current perspective of the pro or anti-EU rhetoric, the 21st century discourse of political science considers notions of ‘modemization’ and ‘Europeanism’ that have always been synonymous in the mainstream of Romanian life. The stock theme of allegiance to Western values runs through modern Romanian history and translates into the rhetorical commonplace of revolution. By association, the Romance-speaking indigenous population of Moldova shares in the same tradition.

2. The Identity-Building Function of English-Written Social Science

Since the foundation of the nation state, Romanian cultural politics has negotiated the ethos of revolution in scientific literature (history, sociology, etc.) as well as in the literary genres of the novel, memoir, etc. What it all comes down to is tracking down (an almost Marxist sense of) the continuous struggle to overthrow the existing social order and, implicitly, cultural paradigm. Everything started with the systemic transformation of Romanian society throughout 19th century. At the time, insurrectional moments, popular revolts, feats of diplomatic manoeuvring, or military campaigns marked the becoming of Romanian lands and of their citizens. Once the Phanariat age (1711–1821) ended, the Oriental lifestyle and administration of the Danubian Principalities (the historical Moldova and Wallachia) were gradually Westernized. The 1848 Romanian revolution in the principalities led to their union in
1859 and the former Ottoman-ruled countries achieved formal independence in 1877. Romania gained the status of kingdom and Western recognition in 1881. Everything happened while foreign-educated elites built the nation state in accordance to European models (the French nation state comes to mind) and, for the most part, welcomed the German-born Prince/King, Carol I.

All these states of exception, conventionally known as revolutions, are romantic episodes in the history of the nation. They were won, lost, or betrayed and, reading Moldo-Romanian academic writing in political science, it feels safe to say that they make for the bulk of Romanian self-identification.

2.1. The Exceptional Romanian Scenario

In the last decade of the 20th century, Romanian infatuation with the revolutionary spirit had an unexpected effect. Even if the language of Romanianism (i.e., Romanian nationalism) is largely an internal affair, the 1989 revolution unquestionably made it outside the borders. As far as the Western world is concerned, it seems that Romanians have managed to stamp their authority, better said their ethnynom, on each and every revolutionary action that has particularly bloody outcomes. Incidentally or not, the violent end of totalitarian regimes and, specifically, the death sentence of former leaders/dictators, have come to be known throughout the English-speaking world as the Romanian scenario. As expected, the coined phrase is a reaction to the only blood-soaked revolution in Eastern Europe, at the time of the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. Above all, the “violent overthrow of the Ceausescus in December 1989 and their summary execution on Christmas Day” (Wilson, 2005: 122) are summed up in the ‘Romanian scenario’.

It is safe to say that, once again, the lingering belief in a Romanian “exceptionalism” (Tismaneanu, 1997: 403) takes to the stage of history, this time as told from the Western point of view. The state of exception helps with national self-identification once more and has a habit of popping up at convenient times in Romanian history. If the ‘Romanian scenario’ is rather famous in the Western world, the narrative recollection of similar events is a common occurrence in the country’s literary culture, something deemed worthy of social science books too. The Romanian master story elaborates on the “traditional image” (Scholes, Phelan, Kellog, 2006: 27) of revolution, uprising, and social unrest. It is a common topos to remark that both the average Romanian and iconic national heroes have always worked to establish a new, better, social order. Although allegedly they all succeeded in doing so, it
comes as no surprise that, sooner or later, yet another hero is looking for
the same old ‘new, better, social order’.

My choice of primary sources should help the public better
understand the teleological unfolding of national history in 21st-century,
English-written social science authored by Romanian and Moldovan
scholars. Sebastian Vaduva and Petru Filip’s “Governmental
Administration and the Security of Romania in a Global Context”
(2015), Dan Dungaciu’s “Geopolitics and Security by the Black Sea:
The Strategic Options of Romania and Republic of Moldova” (2015),
and Igor Prisac’s “Between Russia and the EU: The Sociopolitics of the
Republic of Moldova-A Transdisciplinary Approach” (2015) exemplify
the use made of classic Romanian historiography’s rhetoric in current
political science. There is one side effect of academic writing in political
sciences: if several articles on the topic of Molto-Romanian relations
are read in sequence the narrative image of the revolution has the
“meaning [of] a motif; insofar as it refers to the world of disembodied
ideas and concepts its meaning is a theme” (Scholes, Phelan, Kellog,
2006: 26).

Indigenous self-identification seems to be the cornerstone of a story
about impending disaster for the entire world. For now, the all-out
conflict is averted but apocalypse looms in the background of an
adversarial worldview. Essentially, such a reading of geopolitics shows
that “if anything defines narrativity, it is precisely such an attitude: the
one adopted when one puts forward information on events that have
happened, could happen or should be prevented from happening” (Bal,
2007: 7). I mean that political science definitely retells what happened
but mostly dispenses words of advice and warnings. Stripped to its
essentials, the plot of Molto-Romanian political science written in
English is patterned on the story of Russian conquests and defeats
throughout Eastern Europe. In view of that, the work of the authors
above-mentioned provides anecdotal evidence of the way cultural
politics is being reconfigured in two Eastern European sister states,
Romania and the Republic of Moldova.

The concern with “Moldo-Romanian linguistic identity” (King,
2000:131) corroborates a theory of national designation that
acknowledges not only the (virtually) ethnic tradition of historical
Moldova but also the modern literary culture of the Romanian nation state.
Namely, Moldovan scholars are bound to consider national self-identification
as recorded in various narratives of Romanian literary culture, and
eventually, as recorded in the master story of the one Orthodox,
Romance-speaking East European nation. Besides, awareness of the
literariness one language or another displays adds to the self-conscious
narrative of identity always present in nation-building. Narrativity even has a metafictional twist, which insistently points to the medium of the story rather than to the unfolding of the plot. The focus on “sociopolitical system’s self-organizations” (Prisac, 2015: 95) in both countries, as well as on the literal language games of politics in Moldova, discloses the infatuation with the ethos of systemic transformations in Moldo-Romanian political science.

The rhetoric of exceptionalism works on two levels. Firstly, there is a sequence of paradigm shifts in history, structured on the promise of substituting the existing social order. Such instances of social unrest, be they small-scale uprisings or popular revolts, are mostly known as revolutions. Namely, those of 1821 and 1848 are the first to be recorded by Romanian modern history. The first ended the so-called Phanariot age in the Danubian principalities and the latter attempted to pave the way for the union of Wallachia and Moldova. Next in line are the political union itself in 1859, and the year of 1881 when the newly established country was granted the status of kingdom. World War I and the short-lived glory of Greater Romania, the Popular Republic in the aftermath of World War II, and, last but not least, the ‘exceptional’ 1989 revolution are, most of the times, in the background of Romanian self-identification.

Secondly, there is the belief that all the above-mentioned are authoritative statements of Romanian achievements, more or less singular in world history. The very idea of two contiguous Romance-speaking countries, alone among their neighbours in South-Eastern Europe, validates the contention that the nation is worthy of notice. However, it is also a bone of contention, which becomes apparent in the exchange between my primary sources too. Speaking one’s native tongue stands for political allegiance, and the events of early 1990s in the Republic of Moldova prove that “at that stage the Moldovan society becomes divided into several groups: the ones who opt for Romania, the ones who opt for Russia, [...], and the ones who want to maintain the status quo.” (Prisac, 2015: 85–86). Anyway, both the language and the message of reporting on Moldova come to show the divisive nature of current cultural politics pursued by various Russian and Romanian institutions in the country. For instance, former president Traian Basescu’s take on removing the Black Sea “from the sole influence of the Russian Federation” (Dungaciu, 2015: 45) was aimed at Moldova too. One way or another, Eastern Moldova has everything to do with the former Danubian principalities and the very notion of ‘security by the Black Sea’ seems to entail the present day Republic of Moldova.

The deep-seated mistrust of Russian imperialism that permeates Romanian cultural history is conspicuous in the nation’s current political
science. Explicitly, I feel that English-written, 21st-century Moldo-Romanian political science gives evidence concerning the Russian menace, as perceived by the indigenous elite even prior to the 1812 annexation of Eastern Moldova. Ever since, the desire of exposing Russian empire-building for what it really is makes instant sense in the mainstream of Romanian life: “my father made it clear to my young mind what Bessarabia was and how the Russians had taken it from us, as they were much more powerful than we were” (Rosetti, 1920; 1921: 10). The memoirs and fiction of Radu Rosetti, one of the “pioneers of Romanian societal history” (Kellogg, 1990: 25) look back on the 18th and 19th centuries and make this very point. Although according to some Western scholars “Russian occupation [...] modernized Romania” (Barkey, 1997: 111), the native literary culture remembers the Russian troops stationed in the principalities for entirely different reasons. Storytelling about Russian military presence on the territory of contemporary Romania dwells on what is, essentially, the colonial intent of Moscow. This is also acknowledged by the entry for ‘Romania’ in the *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, which says that the Danubian principalities, prior to their union, were nothing less than “Russian protectorates”.

Moldo-Romanian political science quotes such anecdotal evidence that Romanian literary culture has provided the average Romanian with, ever since late 19th century, if not earlier. The way the local society remembers the past is obvious in the choice over the subject matter to be translated into English versus the topics never touched upon with the English-speaking world. For instance, today’s political science shares with early 20th-century, English-written, documentary literature about the kingdom of Romania (also authored by natives for the Anglo-American public) the same identity-building function that hinges upon the topos of revolution. Essentially, Romanian self-identification is steeped in the tradition of ‘resentment’ nationalism. Much like Liah Greenfeld’s reading of French and English cross-cultural exchange in history, Romanian and Russian confrontation on Bessarabian soil has led to a rhetoric of recrimination, which builds “the ideological foundations of [...] national consciousness” (Greenfeld, 1992: 180). Facing the Eastern threat, contemporary authors would have modern Romanians follow the glorified example of Finland in World War II and fight back on behalf of their ancestors who stood up to Russian aggression in the past. Although phrased as a question, the meaning of

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1 My translation of “tata îmi țări pentru înțelesul minții mele ce era Basarabia și cum ni-o răpise răzii fiindcă erau mai tari mult decât noi”.
the address is unmistakable: “Romania – A Black Sea Finland?” (Dungaci, 2015: 39). Finally, public storytelling spells out one and the same reason for indigenous misgivings about Russia: “Six times during the nineteenth century did the armies of the Czar invade and batter upon the Rumanian lands” (Lupu, 1919: 116). Basically, Bessarabia is the consequence of such expansionist policies, the name itself being extended “over all this territory” from the “southernmost” (Mirasca, 2002: 10) parts of historical Moldova.

The theses of Romanian historiography are recognizable in the discourse of present Moldo-Romanian political science, “The historical development of the Republic as a state is closely linked, both culturally and linguistically, to its neighbour, Romania” (Priscu, 2015: 85). The cultural practice of deciding what is essentially Romanian, Russian or Moldovan boils down to either ethnic or historical rights to one province or another.

2.2. Conflicting Emotions: Capitalist Atlanticism versus Socialist Eurasianism

An inescapably bipolar world, made up out of parent-states and contemporary colonies surrounds, mostly with hostile intentions, the Moldovan polity. Romania’s “double membership—of the North Atlantic Alliance and, post-2007, of the European Union” (Dungaci, 2015: 24) means that not only the area at large, but also Moldo-Romanian relations are shaped by the clash between “capitalist Atlanticism” and “socialist Eurasianism” (Dungaci, 2015: 44).

The resilience of a 19th-century, nation state ideology is manifest in current political discourses and, unreservedly, in the partisan exchange between nationally-minded political scientists who assess geopolitics and security in Eastern Europe. On the one side of the fence, there is the Russian “geopolitician Aleksandr Dugin” (Dungaci, 2015: 44). His words are deemed revealing of whatever his country has in store for NATO and the West. Simply put, he is portrayed as the mouthpiece of the Euro-Asian community that opposes the EU, and is currently in the making: “the Russian Federation, in turn, becomes an attractor and, simultaneously, an alternative, or secondary, entrostat” (Priscu, 2015: 100). Like in all good stories, at stake is something plain to see: the control over former Soviet republics in Eastern Europe, with the Republic of Moldova listed among Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine (Dungaci, 2015: 39). Moreover, the trouble is not necessarily the Russian other, as much as the “indecisiveness to set the border wide enough so as to include peoples and nations that would like to be part of this area” (Ibidem: 24).
On the other, the simultaneously Europhile and pro-American political scientists of the “Euro-Atlantic frontier space” (Ibidem: 48) have their say on what it means to be “at the forefront of Euro-Atlantic expansion” (Vaduva; Thomas, 2015: vii) into the ex-Soviet bloc. The language of political science comes across as ‘offensive’, that is to say it conveys the transfer of democracy to the East and also succeeds in offending the enemy. The South-Eastern border of NATO and of the EU (the eastern border of Romania, i.e., the river Prut) conveys meanings that are transferred to the whole of Eastern Europe and, particularly to the Moldo-Romanian area. Effectively, this should explain the current state of affairs in the former Soviet republic, which is in one of the “areas raising claims […] over, or of belonging to, a clearly defined area and to an inclusion within a certain border to which they do not, as of yet, have access” (Dungaciu, 2015: 25). It comes with the territory of English-written social science that all the above-mentioned authors necessarily take sides. English is the meeting ground between Moldo-Romanian and Russian perspectives on the Balkans and the Black Sea.

Moreover, the prospect of becoming “Russian colonies” (Dungaciu, 2015: 49), as it was the case with the Danubian principalities prior to 1859, is openly mentioned: 21st-century, Eastern (former Soviet) ‘weak states’ fit the profile of potential Russian colonies. The cautious wording of the issue by Igor Prisac contrasts with the straightforward approach favoured by Sebastian Vaduva and Petru Filip. In their words, “the challenges and provocations of Europeanization” (Vaduva; Filip, 2015: 17) in Romania deal with the “quiet desperation and apathy” (Ibidem, 12), which engulfed the nation in the aftermath of the 1989 revolution, once “it became painfully real how distant Romania was from Europe and how difficult it would be to catch up” (Ibidem). However, Romania’s proximity to central Europe meant that its “informational entropy was lower in comparison with that of the Republic of Moldova” (Prisac, 2015: 86). In other words, the Russian grip on the country was strong enough to cause trouble the way it failed to do in Romania.

All my primary sources read the overlap between ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Euroasian’ politics in the Moldo-Romanian area in a contrastive manner. The ex-Soviet Republic and the ex-Eastern Bloc country are regarded as a litmus test of Western commitment to combat Moscow’s current policy of empire-building. Alongside other regional players, each of the two countries exemplifies “(geo)political events—whether evolutions or stagnations—carried out around the Black Sea” (Dungaciu, 2015: 24). They come together as opposites whose “europeanization would be the measure of the extent to which domestic/ internal changes were triggered by” (Ibidem: 40) capitalist Atlanticism. As far as
Moldova is concerned, the looming prospect of colonial subjection to Moscow, i.e., the return to former Tsarist and Soviet circumstances, is either feared or relished by 21st century Moldovan citizens. The conclusion reached is that the present day independent republic is “still yet to solve its natural, historical and linguistic identity issues, and bears the geopolitical influence of both the West, and the East” (Prisac, 2015: 86).

Coming to terms with the past means that Moldovan contemporary history translates into a sequence of insurrectional moments, i.e., into the conflicting emotions brought about by notions of “change”, “evolution”, “development” (Ibidem: 87). Everything “start[ed] before the declaration of independence” (Ibidem: 84), and in Igor Prisac’s words, the reader finds out that “the first substantial self-organization [...] undertaken at the time of the Soviet system’s collapse and of the Republic’s gaining a democratic development pathway” (Ibidem: 90) is definitely something of a revolution. From that moment on, “the Moldovan socio-political system’s restructuring and developing [which] was not bottom-up but top-to-bottom” (Ibidem: 93) has undergone quite a number of “considerable transformations at the beginning of the twenty-first century” (Ibidem: 90). Increasingly, “the history of Romanian governance (1989–present day)” (Vaduva; Filip, 2015:10) is a story that openly addresses the common heritage of the two countries and the foreign policy of Bucharest considers “the Black Sea, and implicitly, the Republic of Moldova, a target of maximal interest for Romania” (Dungaciu, 2015: 29).

To cut a long story short, “Bucharest’s shift in paradigm regarding its relations to the Republic of Moldova, in particular terms, and to the Black Sea, in general terms, must take place. There was perhaps never a more pressing need for long-term projects” (Dungaciu, 2015: 48).

3. Concluding on the Revolutionary Rhetoric of Moldo-Romanian Political Science

In 2015, Moldo-Romanian political science remembers the past in an antagonistic manner, which essentially is meant to settle old scores. The adversarial worldview of nation state politics lies at the core of Romanian self-identification and 21st century academic writing in social sciences serves the greater good of society. The choice over the subject matter to be translated into English versus other topics, never touched upon with the English-speaking world, reveals the rhetorical commonplaces of Romanian historiography. As recorded in the discourse of social sciences, Romanian cultural politics still argues for a theory of ethnic agency that is steeped in the romantic tradition of the biological movement toward the final end of a 20th century nation state.
Of course, the ‘becoming’ happened over a time whose duration is determined by revolutionary shifts and changes. These paradigm shifts had the purpose of emulating examples based on Western values. For instance, the grand French-made model of the state has always been considered in terms of unity, equality, etc., since the reign of Al. I. Cuza, if not earlier. Basically, the rhetoric of alignment to the West is, somewhat redundantly, even now constantly at play in the making of a Romanian identity that has gained the recognition of E. U. accession. Westemizing the Moldo-Romanian identity has to do with a condition of social, political, or religious otherness obvious in the claim of aboriginality made by ethnic Romanians by means of their literary culture and national tradition.

Finally, it is safe to say that the Romanian master story features an eagerness to take up revolutionary challenges. English-written political science is a vehicle of national self-identification that dwells on such particular instances of social unrest, revolts and revolutions. The national narrative seems to hinge on working out which event of the past is the most important for current adjustments to the demands of 21st century Europeanization. The characteristic spirit of the address is to claim that there is plenty to choose from, which should make the case of Romanian fortitude and sense of purpose throughout history.

The above-mentioned reference frame is plain to see in the writing of Sebastian Vaduva, Petru Filip, Dan Dungaciu, and Igor Prisac. They provide insight into Romanian self-identification: the ‘exceptional’ 1989 Romanian revolution is metonymic for the Romanian narrative quest for identity. The landmarks of Romanian memory make sense to the reading public, and are largely exemplified in the discourse of political science, which makes the most out of the traditional revolutionary theme and consequent national self-identification. The Romanian literary language itself is proof that both the medium and the message of influential public narratives have fostered a sense of identity fond of indulging in talk about revolutions. Much like in mainstream Romanian literary culture, shifts of power and systemic transformations are always at stake in Moldo-Romanian political science, particularly when it comes to insurrecional moments and their translation into English.

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